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Bill Meacham finds Ethics Without Morals easy enough
to live with, Nick Everitt is uncertain about a book on
Knowledge, whilst Patricia Cleveland-Peck gets some
‘dodgy’ advice from philosophers concerning How To Live.
way to adjudicate between them; and, that
there exists no plausible account of how an
objective morality has any connection to
the rest of the universe we know about –
the idea is metaphysically incoherent. Of
the three explanations, the only one left
standing is the evolutionary one.
With so much at stake, one would per-
haps expect an extensive discussion of just
how our sense of morality may have
evolved, the various ways it manifests in
our lives and societies, the different flavors
it takes, and so forth, along the lines of
Jonathan Haidt, Stephen Pinker, Richard
Joyce and others. In fact Marks spends
remarkably little time defending the evolu-
tionary view. That’s because he takes it to
be well established already, and because he
has his sights set on something more: why
it is advisable not even to pretend that
morality exists: “A clear-eyed review of the
relative effects of believing and disbeliev-
ing in morality would move us to prefer an
amoral regime” he says (p.38).
Meta-Ethical Marks
Marks is so eager to divest himself of
anything that sounds like morality that he
says there’s nothing we should do (because
there are no moral ‘shoulds’), only what we
want to do – a view of human nature that
he calls ‘desirism’. All we ever do is what
we want to do, he says. So the goal of his
work is to convince us to desire amoralism.
In this effort Marks succeeds brilliantly.
His chapter entitled ‘Might Amorality Be
Preferable?’ includes an excellent rant
against the defects of our typical sense of
morality: morality makes us angry; it pro-
motes hypocrisy; it encourages arrogance;
it’s arbitrary, because there is no final justi-
fication for saying anything is right or
wrong; it is imprudent, leading us to do
things that have obviously bad conse-
quences; it makes us intransigent, fueling
endless strife; it is useless as a guide to life;
and it leads philosophers to waste time on
silly puzzles. By contrast, amorality is free
of guilt, tolerant, interesting, explanatory
and compassionate (when the blinders of
blame are removed, we are free to consider
others with an open heart), not to mention
true. The upshot is that amorality is far
more preferable. If you read only this
verse, much like gravity, and we have
developed an intuition to perceive it. The
third is that the belief in morality was a
useful evolutionary adaptation that lingers
on even though it is no longer helpful.
The evolutionary explanation makes the
best sense, according to Marks. Develop-
ment of a sense of morals was evolutionarily
adaptive for early humans because it enabled
them to live cooperatively in groups. We
evolved to believe in morality because we
have to live with others in order to survive,
and moral rules regulate how we get along
together. A shared sense of morals makes
for group cohesion, and those who live in
cohesive groups survive and reproduce
better than those who don’t. As primatolo-
gist Frans de Waal has noted, human soci-
eties are support systems within which tem-
porary weakness does not automatically
spell death (Our Inner Ape, 2005, p.187).
Crucially, this explanation does not
require that morality actually exist in an
objective sense; all it requires is that
people believe it does. There is an obvious
objection here, and to his credit Marks
considers it: this explanation does not
require that morality does not exist, either.
The evolutionary argument is quite com-
patible with either of the other explana-
tions. Against this possibility, Marks
argues a form of Occam’s Razor: the evo-
lutionary explanation alone is simpler and
conceptually more economical than it
would be in conjunction with either of the
others. But Occam’s Razor alone is not
enough to discredit them, so Marks must
consider each independently.
Against the God explanation he cites
Plato’s Euthyphro, in which Socrates argues
that it makes more sense to say that the
gods love what is right rather than that the
right is whatever the gods love. Hence,
morality (ie right and wrong), if it exists at
all, exists independently of the gods (or of
God). This leaves the second idea – that
morality is a natural feature of the uni-
verse. Against this, Marks argues a number
of things: that morality in this sense would
be a set of commands without a comman-
der, a nonsensical notion; that the only
way of perceiving moral commands is
through intuition, but different people





quite a profound change
of outlook with respect to the study of
ethics and morality. Formerly a Kantian
who worked out in some detail how the
moral dictates of pure reason apply to par-
ticular circumstances, he is now a moral
anti-realist, asserting that there are actually
no moral dictates at all! Marks’ book, Ethics
without Morals, is a readable exposition of
his new position, which he calls ‘amorality’,
after ‘atheism’. Just as atheism denies the
objective existence of God, amorality denies
the objective existence of morality.
As philosophers, we need to get clear on
our concepts. What is morality? Marks’
answer: morality is a set of absolute and
universal imperatives and prohibitions – a
set of rules which everyone is obliged to
obey. This set of imperatives is supposed
to apply to all human beings at all times
and places. The moral rules trump all
other rules, and manifest in our feelings as
spontaneous intuitions or impulses to obey
or enforce them. The essence of morality
is its universal, unchanging, and absolute
authority in matters of human behavior.
Following Kant, Marks calls moral imper-
atives ‘categorical’, meaning that they
apply unconditionally, and independently
of how we feel about them. In brief,
morality is a set of obligations that we are
all supposed to obey. This is what we
mean by the term ‘morality’, by and large,
in common language. And morality in this
sense does not actually exist, says Marks.
The Genesis of Morality
Marks argues that there are several pos-
sible explanations for our belief in moral-
ity, and that the one that does not assume
that morality exists makes a lot more sense
than the others. 
The first possible explanation for belief
in morality is that God legislates it and
gave us a conscience so we would know
right from wrong. The second is that
morality is a built-in feature of the uni-
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chapter, you will have gained a lot.
Marks is here making a meta-ethical
claim – a claim about the status of ethics –
which claim I like to explain in terms of
the language that might be used to express
it. That is, throughout the history of phi-
losophy there have been two competing
domains of discourse regarding ethics and
morals, the Right and the Good. The
Right pertains to duty and obligation: it
refers to an obligation to obey moral rules;
laws that are taken to be applicable univer-
sally and independent of one’s own prefer-
ences. The Good pertains to benefits and
harms: it is thinking in terms of conse-
quences of actions that may be good or
bad for the agent or others. In these terms,
Marks’ claim (which I find persuasive) is
that Goodness trumps Rightness – that it
makes more sense to speak of ethics (ie,
ideas of the best way to live in society) in
terms of benefits and harms than to speak
in terms of duty and obligation. He does
not quite spell it out that way, but his pref-
erence for ‘goodness’ or ‘benefit’ language
is clear from passages such as these:
• “Believing this particular truth, that
morality does not exist, will make things
go better.” (p.2)
• “Morality... does not exist and... it would
be good for us to believe that.” (p.3) 
• “Abandonment of moral thinking and
speaking... would be more effective in
achieving... [a] common goal of maximally
satisfying our considered desires.” (p.63)
• “Morality breeds escalation of conflict,
which is often to no one’s net benefit.” (p.66)
But if morality does not exist and it
would be beneficial for us to quit speaking
in moral terms, what is the alternative?
What is the best way to live our lives?
Marks’ answer is to pursue only what you
desire after due consideration:
“We now... have a replacement criterion to guide
our actions in general, to wit: Figure out what you
really want, that is, the hierarchy of your desires all
things considered, and then figure out how to
achieve or acquire it by means that are themselves
consonant with that prioritized set of your consid-
ered desires.” (p.53)
We might call this Marks’ categorical
imperative, except that he is quite clear that
it is not a moral command but only advice.
In contrast to morality, ethical commands,
he says, are hypothetical, their application
being contingent upon what is desired. By
this he means that you can legitimately offer
advice such as, “If you want to be trusted,
then you ought to be honest” (ethics), but
you can’t legitimately tell someone that they
must absolutely be honest, without context
and without reference to what they want
(morality). Amoralist ethics is therefore
quite practical, in that it lends itself to evi-
dence-based assessments of how best to
proceed; and it is intrinsically motivating,
because its advice is based on what you
actually want, not on what someone else
tells you to do.
Amoral Advice
There’s a lot to like here. There are a
few rough spots, to be sure. There’s an
egregious bit of sophistry on p.24, in which
Marks assumes what he says needs proving.
The discussion of evolution deserves a
lengthier treatment. (Hmm, ‘deserves’. Am
I making a moral judgment?) And I suspect
that it would not be so easy to abandon our
sense of morality, since it is built-in by sev-
eral hundreds of thousands of years of evo-
lution. But these minor blemishes are far
outweighed by the great service Marks has
done in pointing out that the moral
emperor has no clothes. The practicality of
amoralism, in contrast to the intransigence
of moralism, is quite appealing.
But I feel impelled to articulate one crit-
icism: that Marks does not go far enough.
He tells us to consider what we really want
and then to act on our desires; but he gives
no guidance about what to really want – by
which I mean, no guidance about what it is
important or advisable to want. What is
important enough to care about? He asks
us to pay attention to “our considered
desires,” but on what basis shall we con-
sider them? Certainly we all have compet-
ing desires. How then shall we evaluate
them? How shall we decide which of the
contestants to favor? What is the best thing
(or even a pretty good thing) to desire with
sufficient intensity that we are moved to
actually strive to achieve it?
‘What’s the best thing to desire?’ is not
a trivial question. Rather, it is one of the
fundamental questions that philosophers
have considered, since Socrates or earlier.
Marks should at least offer some advice,
then. That’s what philosophy, the pursuit
of wisdom, is all about. (That’s a non-
moral use of the word ‘should’, by the way:
it means what is socially expected, not what
is morally commanded.) 
What would the advice be? My own
view is that it would have to do with what
leads us to a fulfilling and flourishing life.
Thinkers as diverse as Kant and Socrates
agree that the desire to survive, thrive and
feel happy and fulfilled is fundamental and
essential to all humans. If you disagree and
think something else is more to be desired,
then consider that in order to fulfill that
alternative desire, you would have to sur-
vive and thrive at least enough to be able
to attain it, and once you attained it, you
would, I presume, feel happy and fulfilled.
So functioning well enough to survive and
thrive is the fundamental aim of all of us.
Given that premise, the philosophical
question becomes an empirical one: what
enables us to function well? How are we
constituted, what is good for us, and what
are we good for and good at? In short:
What is human nature? 
I won’t attempt to answer these ques-
tions here, but this shows there’s more to
the story of ethics than just to do what you
want after due consideration. We can for
instance make generalizations about what
makes most people happy or what promotes
the welfare of most people, and we can gen-
erate advice based on those generalizations.
Such advice, being empirically based, would
have a great deal of force. I think Marks
would agree that it would have much more
force than moralistic judgments based on
false metaphysical presuppositions.
In sum, Marks has produced a thought-
provoking work. I have not described all of
it. There is a chapter on how an amoralist
would address the contentious issue of
animal welfare, for instance. There is
another chapter on various alternative ways
to conceive of morality. Scattered through-
out are hints that Marks doubts many of the
usual conceptions of free will. Perhaps he
will write about that topic in the future. If
so, I expect to read it with as much pleasure
as I had reading Ethics without Morals.
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